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ON THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK OF THE ‘ANONYMUS
IAMBLICHI’ (DIELS–KRANZ 89)*
ABSTRACT
The political outlook of the so-called ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ (DK 89) has been a subject
of controversy in the scholarly literature, with some commentators judging him to be a
committed democrat, while others see in him a partisan of aristocracy or even oligarchy.
This disagreement is not surprising, for the text contains passages that seem to pull in
opposite directions. The article suggests that we move beyond the one-dimensional
oligarch-or-democrat model traditionally employed and instead approach the issue
from a fresh angle, applying the more nuanced typology for understanding ancient social
criticism (‘rejectionist’ vs ‘immanent’) developed by Josiah Ober.
The article begins by situating the author within the social landscape of classical
Athens. The resulting characterization presents the author as a representative of a distinctive
social type: the Athenian ‘rich quietist’, who prefers private economic endeavours
to engagement in public affairs, and who is ideologically committed to democratic
government but also highly critical of how democratic society treats its wealthy citizens.
This characterization helps make better sense of the seemingly contradictory political
indications in the text. In particular, fragments 6 and 7 should be read as a single line
of argument, which takes the form of an ‘immanent critique’ of contemporary Athenian
democracy. According to ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, democratic society rightly praises the
rule of law as a distinctive democratic value, but it falls disappointingly short of that
ideal in its treatment of its own wealthy elite citizens.
Keywords: ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’; Athenian democracy; quietism; rule of law; immanent
criticism; Isocrates; Xenophon; Plato
1. A NEW APPROACH TO THE ‘ANONYMUS IAMBLICHI’
Few writers from antiquity have had such a wide array of political viewpoints and party
affiliations ascribed to them as the anonymous Greek author traditionally referred to as
the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ (89 DK)—literally ‘Iamblichus’ unnamed author’, because
his work has been preserved for us in the form of seven extended but unmarked citations
by the late third- and early fourth-century C.E. philosopher Iamblichus in his
Protreptikos.1 While most scholars agree, on the basis of both linguistic analysis and
considerations of content, that these excerpts likely derive from an otherwise
* This article was made possible by a COFUND Junior Research Fellowship at the Department of
Classics and Ancient History, Durham University (2018–2019). I am grateful to Phil Horky, Leo
Catana, Anthony Hooper and CQ’s reviewer for helpful suggestions and comments.
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1 The first to identify and isolate the text of an anonymous Greek author in ch. 20 of Iamblichus’
work was F. Blass, ‘De Antiphonte sophista Iamblichi auctore’, Kieler Festprogramm (Kiel, 1889).
The general reliability of Iamblichus as a transmitter of earlier authors has been established by
D.S. Hutchinson and M.R. Johnson, ‘Authenticating Aristotle’s Protrepticus’, OSAPh 29 (2005),
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unpreserved treatise by an Athenian (or at least Attic-writing) author from the Greek
Classical period,2 scholarly opinion on the specific question of the author’s political
outlook has been all over the map. Pointing to and emphasizing different elements in
the text, scholars have found in the author everything from a staunch supporter of the
Athenian democracy3 to a conservative ‘moderate’,4 a representative of the traditional
aristocracy,5 or even an anti-democratic partisan of the oligarchic faction.6
The main claim of the present article is that we can make progress with the question
of the political viewpoint of the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ by approaching it from a fresh
angle. As the above cases show, the traditional approach to the question of the political
orientation of the author has taken the form of an attempt to place him somewhere on
a linear political spectrum ranging from ‘full-blown oligarch’ to ‘die-hard supporter
of democracy’. The problem with this one-dimensional approach is not just that the
labels commonly used in order to specify the author’s exact position on the spectrum
(‘democrat’, ‘moderate’, ‘conservative’, ‘oligarch’) are seldom clearly defined and
therefore not particularly informative. More importantly, the approach also risks
becoming somewhat arbitrary when applied to a text such as that of the ‘Anonymus
Iamblichi’, which contains elements that seem to pull in opposite political directions.
Where precisely the pin comes down on the political spectrum will to a large extent
depend on which aspects of the text we choose to privilege at the expense of others.
So it seems worthwhile to search for an alternative and potentially more enlightening
framework for analysis and categorization, which can better account for the text’s
politically mixed signals. A promising candidate here is the typology for political
criticism proposed by Josiah Ober in his Political Dissent in Democratic Athens.
Drawing on the work by Michael Walzer, Ober suggests that we distinguish between
two types of ‘critics’. The rejectionist critic views society and its dominant values as
fundamentally and irremediably flawed. Consequently, her criticism takes the form of
193–294. On the background for Iamblichus’ inclusion of the fragments in his Protreptikos, see J.P.
Dumont, ‘Jamblique lecteur des sophists. Probléme du Protreptique’, in Le Néoplatonisme, Actes du
Colloque de Royaumont, 9–13 juin 1969 (Paris, 1971), 203–14 and P.S. Horky, ‘Anonymus
Iamblichi, On excellence (Περὶ ἀρετῆς): a lost defense of democracy’, in D. Wolfsdorf (ed.), Early
Greek Ethics (Oxford, 2021), 262–92. References to the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ in this article follow
H. Pistelli, Iamblichi Protrepticus ad fidem codicis Florentini (Leipzig, 1888).
2 Linguistic analysis: Blass (n. 1), 2–3; K. Töpfer, ‘Die sogenannten Fragmente des Sophistens
Antiphon bei Iamblichos. Eine kritisch-exegetische Studie’, Arnauer Gymnasium-Programm
(Arnau, 1902); A. Ciriaci, L’Anonimo di Giamblico. Saggio critico e analisi dei frammenti
(Naples, 2013), 59–74. Most scholars place the author in the late fifth or early fourth century B.C.E.,
but D. Musti and M. Mari, Anonimo di Giamblico. La pace e il benessere. Idee sull’economia, la
società, la morale (Milan, 2003) have argued for a mid fourth-century date.
3 K. Bitterauf, ‘Die Brückstücke des Anonymus Iamblichi’, Philologus 68 (1909), 500–22, at 501–
6 (‘der Verfasser [stehlt sich] ohne Vorbehalt auf den Boden der bestehenden athenischen
Demokratie’); W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge, 1971), 73 (a ‘democratic sympathizer’);
Ciriaci (n. 2), 55 (‘un sostenitore della democrazia ateniese’); Horky (n. 1) (‘a lost defense of
democracy’). Cf. also A.T. Cole, ‘The Anonymus Iamblichi and his place in Greek political theory’,
HSPh 65 (1961), 127–63, at 138–9 and 143.
4 S. Schneider, ‘Ein sozialpolitischer Traktat und sein Verfasser’, WS 26 (1904), 14–32, at 19
(an advocate of the Athenian ‘Mittelstand’ and ‘einer gemässigten, agraren Demokratie’); K.F.
Hoffmann, Das Recht im Denken der Sophistik (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1997), 332 (‘Konservativ’);
Musti and Mari (n. 2), especially 256–64, 303 (‘osservanza moderata’, ‘conservatore’).
5 M. Lombardi, ‘Etica, politica ed economia nell’Anonimo di Giamblico (VS 89, 7, 1–9)’, RhM
157 (2011), 129–51, at 144 (‘un intellettuale di estrazione aristocratica’).
6 U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Aristoteles und Athen (Berlin, 1893), 174 n. 77; id., Platon.
Sein Leben und seine Werke (Berlin, 1920), 58 n. 1. Wilamowitz tentatively identifies the author as
Critias.
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an attempt to radically overthrow those basic values and replace them with an entirely
new and better set of values. The immanent critic, by contrast, is ‘a reformer, rather than
a revolutionary. This sort of critic regards the society under examination as capable of
amelioration within the framework of the existing regime. She will therefore work
within a set of norms and values already prevalent (if temporarily dormant) within
her own political culture. The force of her criticism is not destructive; rather, she
calls the citizens to be true to their own highest and finest cultural ideals.’7
As Ober rightly points out, most of the well-known Athenian authors critical of
democracy do not belong squarely in one category or the other. Even Plato can
occasionally adopt the attitude of the immanent critic, and Aristophanes has his
rejectionist moments. The rejectionist/immanent distinction is therefore more useful to
the scholar of Greek political thought as ‘a heuristic device for clarifying different
authorial stances within a corpus (or even within a given text) than as a typology for
categorizing individual authors’.8 But, as we shall see, there is at least one instance
of a Greek political theorist, not discussed by Ober, who can reasonably be said to
belong unqualifiedly in one of the two categories. My suggestion in this article is
that the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ can be helpfully understood as a clear example of an
immanent critic of Athenian democracy. To understand why, it is necessary to attempt
a social characterization of the author. In Section 2, I suggest on the basis of fr. 7 that the
‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ writes from the point of view of a distinctive social type within
the context of democratic Athens: the Athenian rich ἀπράγμων or ‘quietist’. Once this
characterization is established, we can make better sense of his complex stance towards
democracy. As a type, the rich quietist was highly critical of certain aspects of
democratic life in Athens, but not necessarily of democracy as such. As I will argue
in Section 3, the author’s discussion of law and lawfulness in fr. 6 and fr. 7 should
be construed as one continuous argument aimed at showing how Athenian democracy
fails to live up to its own ideals and principles in one specific but important respect:
it professes a strong commitment to the rule of law, but systematically disregards the
legal rights of its wealthy citizens to their private property. The ‘Anonymus
Iamblichi’ emerges as a thinker well deserving of the attention of classicists and
historians alike: a sophisticated and nuanced theorist of democracy, whose ideas and
arguments offer a rare glimpse into the world-view of a distinctive substratum of the
Athenian elite that is not otherwise well represented in our literary sources.
2. A SOCIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ‘ANONYMUS IAMBLICHI’
The seventh fragment cited by Iamblichus provides a natural starting point for an
assessment of the social outlook of the anonymous author. In the first and longest part
of that fragment (101.17–103.19), the author describes, by means of an extended series
of antitheses, the various advantages and disadvantages that accrue from the contrasting
states of eunomia (‘respect for the laws’) and anomia (‘lawlessness’) respectively.9 The
7 J. Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens. Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule (Princeton,
1998), 48.
8 Ober (n. 7), 49.
9 For the meaning of eunomia as ‘respect for the laws’, see Arist. Pol. 1294a3–7; Xen. Oec. 9.14;
[Pl.] Def. 413e. I return to the question of the distinctive connotations of eunomia as a political slogan
below.
ON THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK OF THE ‘ANONYMUS IAMBLICHI ’ 97
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838821000288
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 94.6.184.54, on 15 Jul 2021 at 13:13:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
governing idea throughout the passage is that eunomia is beneficial because it is
conducive to mutual ‘trust’ (πίστις) and ‘social intercourse’ (ἐπιμιξία) within a society,
something which among other benefits creates an atmosphere of respect and solidarity
between different social groups (101.23–9):
When there is respect for the laws, people are able to navigate in the most beneficial manner
what fortune presents them with, whether good or bad, concerning their property and life.
For those who are fortunate enjoy their fortune10 in safety [ἀσφαλεῖ] and without it being
plotted against [ἀνεπιβουλεύτῳ], whereas the less fortunate are supported by the fortunate,
as a result of the social intercourse and trust that come from respect for the laws.11
By contrast, as the author explains at the later parallel passage (103.4–7), in a society
where anomia reigns,
The bad and good fortunes of men pull in opposite directions. For when there is no respect for
the laws, good fortune is not safe but plotted against [οὐκ ἀσφαλής ἐστιν … ἀλλ’
ἐπιβουλεύεται], whereas misfortune cannot be repelled and wins out, owing to the lack of
trust and social intercourse.
The beneficial results of eunomia are here described by the author as a sort of social
‘trickle down’ effect. When the ownership rights of the ‘fortunate’ (that is, wealthy)
citizens are respected and their property is not the object of plotting and intrigue,
those citizens in turn become inclined to come to the aid of their ‘less fortunate’ fellow
citizens.12 The author does not here specify the precise nature of the mutual ‘support’
among citizens that results from a state of eunomia, but the two passages must be
understood against the background of an earlier argument put forward by the author
in fr. 3.13 The second half of that fragment (97.25–98.12) contains an emphatic rejection
of the suggestion that one could become ‘beneficial to as many people as possible’
(πλείστοις ὠφέλιμος) by simply ‘giving out money’ to one’s fellow-citizens
(χρήματα διδοὺς εὐεργετήσει τοὺς πλησίον). Such generous behaviour would be
counterproductive, the author insists, because it would force the benefactor either to
ruin himself or to engage in unjust behaviour in the attempt to make up for his
generosity. It therefore seems unlikely that the ‘support’ praised by the author in fr. 7
would take the form of charity donations or some other form of direct redistribution
of wealth. Rather, as many scholars have suggested, the author’s account in these
two passages is best understood as reflecting a distinctively economic understanding
of the source of social prosperity.14 The idea is hinted at in another set of parallel
passages from fr. 7 immediately preceding the passages cited above, which explain
the effects of eunomia on the general attitude to the use and function of money in
society (101.19–22, 103.1–3). In the climate of trust and social harmony that is
generated by eunomia, the wealthy citizens do not ‘hoard their money away’ (τὰ …
χρήματα … ἀποθησαυρίζουσιν), but rather allow that money to become available
10 I follow DK (cf. Hoffmann [n. 4], 311 n. 58) in supplying τύχῃ to αὐτῇ here, rather than εὐνομίᾳ
as suggested by E. Des Places, Iamblique. Protreptique (Paris, 1989), 128.
11 All translations from the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ are my own.
12 For this use of εὐτυχής in the sense of ‘wealthy’ or ‘prosperous’, see K.J. Dover, Greek Popular
Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1994), 174.
13 Cf. Musti and Mari (n. 2), 285; Ciriaci (n. 2), 184.
14 Hoffmann (n. 4), 311; Musti and Mari (n. 2), 285; Ciriaci (n. 2), 184; M. Faraguna, ‘Pistis and
apistia. Aspects of the development of social and economic relations in classical Greece’,MediterrAnt
15 (2012), 355–74, at 362–3.
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for common use (κοινὰ … τὰ χρήματα γίγνεται) and to ‘circulate’ throughout society
(κυκλούμενα), presumably in the form of business investments, loans, etc., which in
turn helps the lower classes by providing them with opportunities for employment
and financial credit.15
This interpretation of the account of the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ concerning the social
benefits of eunomia is strongly supported by a comparison with a strikingly similar
passage from Isocrates’ Areopagiticus, which also serves helpfully to bring out the
concrete social background that is left implicit by the author.16 As part of his critique
of current Athenian society, Isocrates explains how, in the time of the ‘ancestral’ politeia
of Solon and Cleisthenes, Athens was characterized by harmony and mutual goodwill
between the different social classes. The lower classes did not envy the wealthy
(φθονεῖν, 32) or conspire against their wealth (ἐπιβουλεύειν, 24), and the wealthy in
turn, far from looking down on their social inferiors, ‘regarded poverty among their
fellow-citizens as their own disgrace and came to the aid of the distresses of the
poor, handing over land to some at modest rentals, sending some out to engage in
commerce, and furnishing means to others to enter upon various occupations’ (32).
As Isocrates emphasizes, this beneficial social and economic dynamic was premised
on a widespread respect for the laws, in particular those laws concerned with ownership
rights and property. In financial disputes, rather than being misled by self-serving
motives or indulging their own personal sense of equity, the popular law courts could
be trusted strictly to ‘obey the laws’ (τοῖς νόμοις πειθομένους) and to punish severely
‘those who cause the breakdown of the trustworthiness of contracts’ (τοὺς ἄπιστα τὰ
συμβόλαια ποιοῦντας). This climate of trust and lawfulness meant that the rich, rather
than being forced to hide away their wealth (ἀπεκρύπτετο τὴν οὐσίαν), were confident
about lending it out, thereby benefitting their fellow-citizens as well as promoting their
own economic interests (35). As Isocrates sums it up, in ancestral Athens ‘the ownership
of property was secured [ἀσφαλεῖς] to those to whom it rightly belonged, while the
enjoyment of property was shared [κοιναί] by all the citizens who needed it’ (35).
Viewed against the background of the Areopagiticus, the passages on the social
effects of eunomia in fr. 7 thus point to a broadly conservative social outlook on the
part of the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’. His ideal society is one that is characterized by
the harmonious relationship between distinct social classes, a healthy environment
for economic activity, and respect for private ownership—particularly that of the
wealthy—as the pillar of a well-functioning society. But this general characterization
of the author can be elaborated and made more specific by turning to a particular
element of his account of eunomia in fr. 7. The presence or absence of eunomia within
a society, the author explains, also has profound consequences for how people can
spend their time (102.1–7):
Owing to respect for the laws, people do not have to devote their time to πράγματα but can
spend it on ἔργα of daily living. When the laws are respected, people are freed from the
most unpleasant preoccupations, and can instead enjoy the most pleasant ones. For to be
preoccupied with πράγματα is most unpleasant, whereas concern with ἔργα is most pleasant.
15 The distinctively economic approach to social well-being is among the most original and
intriguing aspects of the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’; see M. Faraguna, ‘All’ origine dell’ oikonomia:
dall’ Anonimo di Giamblico ad Aristotele’, RAL 9 (1994), 551–89; Faraguna (n. 14); and Musti’s
introductory essay in D. Musti and M. Mari, Anonimo di Giamblico. La pace e il benessere. Idee
sull’economia, la società, la morale (Milan, 2003).
16 Cf. Faraguna (n. 15), 583; Faraguna (n. 14), 363–5; Musti and Mari (n. 2), 254–305.
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By contrast, when a state of anomia prevails, ‘men have no time for ἔργα, but concern
themselves with what is unpleasant, that is, πράγματα rather than ἔργα’ (102.26–103.1).
As scholars have often pointed out, the two central terms in these passages, ἔργα and
πράγματα, which in their individual neutral sense can be used more or less as
synonyms, take on a more determinate meaning when they appear in direct opposition
to each other.17 Thus ἔργα come to refer specifically to private and productive activities
aiming at the preservation and well-being of the oikos, as the author twice confirms by
qualifying ἔργα as τῆς ζωῆς, that is, concerned with the daily business of managing
livelihood and property (102.2–3, 102.14). By contrast, πράγματα take on the meaning
of distinctively ‘public’ or ‘political’ activities, that is, those that are carried out within
the general social and institutional context of the polis rather than of the oikos.18
In the general context of fr. 7, the author’s marked preference for ‘pleasant’ ἔργα
over ‘unpleasant’ πράγματα points to an identification of the anonymous author as
representing a distinctive social type within the context of the democratic Athens.
This is the so-called rich ἀπράγμων (‘quietist’), whose characteristic outlook and
concerns can be reconstructed from portrayals of the type in the Athenian orators as
well as in fourth-century intellectuals such as Plato, Isocrates and, especially,
Xenophon.19 Unlike those upper-class Athenians who actively sought a position of
power and public acclaim in democratic politics, the rich quietist simply wants to be
left alone to ‘mind his own business’ (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν).20 To be sure, he is not
indifferent to public opinion and concerns of reputation, but the reputation he is
interested in is that of a respected and well-liked ‘pillar of society’, a successful and
reliable private citizen devoted to the well-being of his friends and community.
Preferring to devote his time and energy on productive and economic activities that
contribute to the wealth of his private household, he perceives politics and public life
as, at best, a waste of valuable time and, at worst, a constantly looming threat to his
economically privileged position. The obligatory liturgies levied on rich Athenians
he views less as an opportunity for public recognition than as an expensive and
troublesome burden, imposed by an ungrateful dēmos on its social and economic
superiors;21 and he lives in perpetual fear of becoming involved in πράγματα, in the
sense of litigation or simply ‘legal troubles’, being plotted against and unjustly dragged
into the popular courts by a ‘sycophantic’ prosecutor out to extract money from him.22
17 Faraguna (n. 15), 584–5; Musti and Mari (n. 2), 287–8.
18 E.g. Thuc. 2.40.
19 For general discussions of the type, see L.B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian (Oxford, 1986), 99–130;
P. Demont, La cité grecque archaïque et classique et l’idéal de tranquillité (Paris, 1990), 105–6;
Faraguna (n. 15), 565–7; R. Osborne, ‘Vexatious litigation in classical Athens: sykophancy and the
sykophant’, in id., Athens and Athenian Democracy (Cambridge, 2010), 205–28, at 220–1. That
the ‘Anonymous Iamblichi’ writes from the point of view of the Athenian rich quietist has also
been suggested by Faraguna (n. 15), 584–7. My contribution adds considerations in favour of the
apragmosunē interpretation and shows how it can help us make better sense of the author’s complex
relation to Athenian democracy.
20 Xen. Mem. 2.9 (Crito); Lys. 19.18. Cf. Plato’s appropriation of the slogan for his own purposes
in Resp. 433a–b.
21 Xen. Oec. 2.5–7 (Critobulus), 7.3 (Ischomachus); Symp. 4.30 (Charmides). The fact that rich
quietists often emphasize their zealous pursuit of liturgical obligations in law-court speeches does
not contradict this point, since such statements are clearly part of a rhetorical strategy aimed at
winning the sympathy of the citizen-judges. Cf. Demont (n. 19), 97–9.
22 Xen. Mem. 2.9 (Crito); Symp. 4.30 (Charmides); Pl. Crit. 44e1–6 (Crito); Isoc. Antid. 8. While
sycophantic litigation was generally presented by the victims themselves as nothing more than a form
of blackmail, it may well (also) have served a more political function by forcing the wealthy elite to
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In general, dominating the self-perception of the rich quietist in Athens is a strong sense
of being permanently ‘under siege’ from the democratic masses who envy and mistrust
their wealthy fellow-citizens and are bend on exploiting them financially.23 Rather than
receiving the respect and dignity he believes his position in society entitles him to, he
portrays himself as trapped in a highly precarious situation in which his private property
is not ‘secure’ (ἀσφαλές) and needs to be closely guarded, or even hidden away, if it is
to remain in the hands of its legally rightful owner.24
The distinctive concerns and world-view of the Athenian rich quietist, as sketched
above, also surface in several of the other preserved fragments of the ‘Anonymus
Iamblichi’. This is perhaps most clear in the case of the second fragment, which is
concerned precisely with the problem of how an outstanding citizen can come to
enjoy the respect and esteem of his fellow-citizens that he deserves, given that people
are generally susceptible to envy and mistrust towards their superiors (96.5–23).
While the question in this fragment is ostensibly raised as an abstract question about
aretē in general, the author’s later preoccupation with property and social cohesion is
already hinted at in the last sentence, where wealth is conspicuously included among
those good qualities that ‘people do not easily accept’ (97.6–8). Other passages likewise
fit the profile. A deep-seated suspicion of politics on the part of the author is clear, not
only from his explicit rejection of competitive philotimia in fr. 4 (99.8–15) but also,
indirectly, from his strikingly ambivalent attitude to rhetorical skill, which is treated
alternately as one of those worthwhile qualities that a person might reasonably aspire
to attain (95.14, 97.17) and as a superficial and somewhat dubious technique that
contrasts negatively with aretē itself (96.26–9).25 Similarly, the rich quietist’s
characteristic resentment of the claims of the political community to his private property
can be discerned in the argument from fr. 3 already referred to above, where the author
emphatically rejects the suggestion that true excellence requires financial generosity on
the part of the wealthy citizen, portraying the idea as misguided and ultimately
self-defeating because the wealthy citizen would either ruin himself or be corrupted
by the attempt to make up for his expenses (97.27–98.5).26 The excellent citizen, the
author insists, is rather someone who is ‘beneficial to as many people as possible’
simply in virtue of his firm commitment to, and support of, law and justice (97.26–7,
98.5–10).
I conclude this section by returning again to the seventh fragment. My suggestion
that the fragments of the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ reflects this particular outlook on the
submit to the authority of the democratic community: Osborne (n. 19). On πράγματα in the specific
sense of ‘legal trouble’: Demont (n. 19), 91; Faraguna (n. 14), 584–5.
23 Xen. Symp. 4.29–33 (Charmides; cf. ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος… ἀπιστεῖσθαι, 29); 4.45 (Callias); Oec.
2.5–7 (Critobulus); Ar. Eq. 264–5. Cf. Carter (n. 19), 111.
24 Isoc. Antid. 159, Areop. 35; Xen. Symp. 3.9.
25 Compare Xenophon’s portrayal of Ischomachus, who admits the value of rhetoric as a means of
self-defence in the law courts but also distances himself from its more questionable practitioners with
the remark that, while he is reasonably good at pleading his case when it is expedient to speak the
truth, ‘when I need to tell a lie, by Zeus, I cannot convert the worse cause into the better’ (Oec.
11.25). On this passage, see also below.
26 The specific target of the author’s criticism is often taken to be the kind of
largesse-as-political-strategy associated especially with the Athenian statesman Cimon (Arist. [Ath.
Pol.] 27.3; Plut. Cim. 10, Per. 9; cf. Faraguna [n. 15], 582; Musti and Mari [n. 2], 191). However,
the argument could also be read as a more general criticism of any understanding of public service
that implies direct financial commitments on the part of the individual private citizen, whether in
the form of expected donations or in the performance of expensive liturgies.
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relation between (elite) individual and democratic society is supported by the author’s
use, in that fragment, of two specific tropes from the elite apragmosunē discourse in
Athens.
(1) The rich quietist is often portrayed as complaining that the precarious situation in
which he finds himself is a threat, not only to his social and economic status but also to
his peace of mind.27 Xenophon’s Charmides ironically remarks how his psychological
well-being has significantly improved after he became poor: whereas as a wealthy man
he led a miserable life dominated by constant fear of being taken to court by a sycophant
and losing his property, now that he is no longer wealthy, ‘I stretch out and enjoy a
sound sleep’ (ἡδέως μὲν καθεύδω ἐκτεταμένος, Symp. 4.31); and Aristophanes, in
the parabasis to Wasps, lists among the comic targets of his previous plays the
sycophantic prosecutors, who ‘lying in the beds of the quietists among you
[κατακλινόμενοί τ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς κοίταις ἐπὶ τοῖσιν ἀπράγμοσιν ὑμῶν], piled up against
them lawsuits, summonses and witnesses to such an extent, that many of them flew
in terror to the Polemarch for refuge’ (1039–42).28 The ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ similarly
emphasizes the peace of mind and, in particular, the pleasant sleep that citizens enjoy
when they are not plagued by πράγματα but allowed to preoccupy themselves with
ἔργα (102.8–16):
When they [sc. those living in a state of eunomia] go to sleep, which is people’s respite from
trouble, they do so without fear and painful thoughts, and they are in the same condition when
they wake up …29 [Rather than living in fear], they pleasantly turn their attention towards the
ἔργα of daily living, which brings no pain, alleviating their toil with reliable and well-founded
expectations concerning the good to come in reward. (Cf. the parallel passage on anomia:
103.14–18.)
(2) Sympathetic portrayals of rich quietists, particularly in Xenophon, describe how the
threat of sycophantic lawsuits often forces the reluctant ἀπράγμων to learn to defend
himself and ‘fight the devil with fire’. Ischomachus is said to have begun to teach
himself a bit of rhetoric in order to make himself more effective in the law courts,
and thus less vulnerable to malicious prosecution (Xen. Oec. 11.21–3); and in one of
Xenophon’s Socratic anecdotes, Crito, complaining that he is being exploited by
malicious prosecutors, is advised by Socrates to become the friend and benefactor of
the poor but rhetorically gifted Archedemus, who will in turn defend him by going
on the legal offensive against the sycophants (Mem. 2.9.1–8). The same basic dynamic
can be observed in fr. 7 of the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, where the author (if in less vivid
terms than Xenophon) explains how a state of anomia, where the private property of the
‘fortunate’ is not secure but plotted against, will eventually lead to ‘counter-plotting’
(ἀντεπιβουλεύοντας), presumably on the part of the wealthy themselves (103.10–13).
3. THE ‘ANONYMUS IAMBLICHI’ AND ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY
Commenting on a passage from Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, where Critobulus complains
about the expensive liturgies imposed on him by the Athenian people (Xen. Oec. 2.6),
27 Cf. M.R. Christ, The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 2006), 175–6.
28 Cf. Demont (n. 19), 105.
29 The Greek text in the excised lines is problematic and probably corrupt: Musti and Mari (n. 2),
306–9.
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Sarah Pomeroy remarks that ‘[t]he tone of this passage is oligarchic, stressing the
unfairness of burdens, and asserting that the demos, in effect, regarded the wealth of
the rich as “their property”.’30 As we have seen, this remark accurately captures the
rich quietist’s attitude towards the liturgical system and what he takes to be the
Athenian people’s lack of respect for (his) private property. But Pomeroy’s inference
concerning the specific political connotations of Critobulus’ complaint (‘oligarchic’)
is too hasty. As Matthew Christ rightly points out in a discussion of similar passages,
‘while these various petulant assertions are coloured by antipathy for democratic
institutions, a wealthy man did not have to be a closet oligarch to see inequality in
the city’s arrangements involving financial obligations; it was hard to miss the fact
that the rich paid a great deal while others paid nothing, especially if one was rich.’31
An interesting passage from Plato’s Republic Book 8 bears this point out. In the course
of his account of democracy’s collapse into tyranny, Socrates proposes to divide the
democratic city into three groups of citizens: the opportunist ‘drones’ who dominate
politics and public life, the rich citizens preoccupied with money-making, and the
dēmos itself in the specific sense of the lower classes. Invoking a familiar trope from
contemporary patrios politeia discourse, Socrates portrays the dēmos as naturally
agricultural and uninterested in politics, explaining how they first become agitated
by populist demagogue-drones who turn the lower classes against their wealthy
fellow-citizens.32 Under these conditions, the rich in effect become the ‘feeding ground’
for the drones (Pl. Resp. 564e13–14), who on their part distribute some of the
confiscated wealth to the lower classes while keeping most of it for themselves
(565a7–8). What is particularly interesting for our purposes is Socrates’ account of
the political attitude of the wealthy citizens who suffer under this exploitative regime
(Pl. Resp. 565b2–c4; transl. Griffith, modified):
SOCRATES: Those whose property is taken away are presumably compelled [ἀναγκάζονται]
to defend themselves by speaking in the assembly and by taking whatever other action they can.
ADEIMANTUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: Even if they have no desire at all for revolution [κἂν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτερίζειν],
they are accused by the others of plotting against the people and being oligarchs.
ADEIMANTUS: Naturally.
SOCRATES: In the end, when they see the people attempting to wrong them [ἀδικεῖν]—not
maliciously but out of ignorance, misled by their slanderers—at that point, whether they like
it or not [εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή], the rich really do become oligarchs, though not from choice
[οὐχ ἑκόντες]. This too is an evil implanted in them by the sting of the drone we were talking
about.
Since this passage is part of Plato’s larger account of how democracy descends into
tyranny, it is not surprising that it ends with the total polarization of democratic political
life into opposing factions, democrats and oligarchs, which in turn sets the stage for
the tyrant to arise. But his starting point is an analysis of democratic society as it is
(cf. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει, 564d1), and as part of that analysis he clearly recognizes
the presence of a distinctive group of rich elite citizens who are committed to, or at
the very least accept, the basic premise of popular rule, but who are also highly
dissatisfied with how they are being treated under the current regime. As Plato
30 S.B. Pomeroy, Xenophon. Oeconomicus. A Social and Historical Commentary (Oxford, 1994),
229.
31 Christ (n. 27), 186.
32 Cf. Isoc. Areop. 24; Arist. Pol. 1318b6–17.
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emphasizes, these elite citizens are not oligarchic sympathizers or supporters of regime
change (cf. κἂν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτερίζειν, 565b6–7) and their eventual defection to
the oligarchic faction is presented as happening very reluctantly (cf. εἴτε βούλονται
εἴτε μή … οὐχ ἑκόντες, 565c1–3). But while they are thus in principle committed to
democratic principles, they are presented as democratic citizens who clearly do not
feel comfortable with the particular form of popular rule under which they live,
which they perceive as unjustly exploiting them financially, mistrusting them politically,
and forcing them to engage in the kind of public business they find highly disagreeable.
The proposed characterization of the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ as writing from the point
of view of this particular type within Athenian society, that is, the rich quietist
committed to democracy in principle but critical of specific aspects of its current
manifestation, provides the basis for coming to a better and more precise understanding
of the political orientation of his argument as a whole. What I suggest is that the
anonymous author represents a remarkably clear example of Ober’s ‘immanent critic’,
whose mode of social criticism is precisely not to radically reject the fundamental values
and principles of her society but rather to subject her society to criticism in the name of
those very values and principles. This strategy of ‘immanent criticism’ emerges clearly
if we read the eulogy of eunomia in fr. 7 as part of a larger argument beginning already
in fr. 6. The sixth fragment is presented as an argument in defence of nomos, ‘law’,
polemically aimed at those who claim that excellence consists in having the power to
pursue pleonexia (‘getting more than one’s fair share’), and that obedience to the
laws is really only cowardice. Against the proponents of this subversive thesis, which
recalls that of Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias,33 the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ argues that
the rule of nomos over men is in fact both natural and beneficial (100.9–18). Human
beings are by nature (ἔφυσαν) unable to live on their own and are by necessity brought
together, forming communities and developing the technical means for survival.
However, since they would not be able to live together in this way without laws
(ἀνομίᾳ), it is necessary that ‘law and justice reign as a king among human beings’
(100.16–17). As the author goes on to argue, not even a hypothetical ‘man of steel’,
invulnerable and immune from suffering, would be better off pursuing a life of
pleonexia in disregard of the laws. On the contrary, he too would need to obey and
support the laws in order to survive (100.9–101.6):
For all men [τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους] would decide to make themselves enemies of the man
who had this nature, because of their respect for the laws [διὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν εὐνομίαν]; and the
multitude [τὸ πλῆθος], either by skill or by strength, would surpass and prevail over such a man.
In this way, it is evident that power itself, in so far as it is power, is preserved by law and justice.
As many commentators have noted, the anonymous author’s argument against the
hypothetical ‘man of steel’ scenario seems less than compelling.34 But what is more
interesting for our purposes are the strikingly democratic ideas and principles that
underpin the argument. According to the author, it is because ‘all men’ would band
together in defence of their shared ideal of respect for the laws that the ‘man of steel’
would be unable to successfully pursue a life of pleonexia. The ultimate guarantor of
lawfulness is the dēmos itself, understood as a strong and competent collective agent
33 Cf. Musti and Mari (n. 2), 231–3; Ciriaci (n. 2), 154–5; Horky (n. 1), 283.
34 Wasn’t the ‘man of steel’ supposed, ex hypothesi, to be invincible? E.g. R.K. Balot, Greed and
Injustice in Classical Athens (Princeton, 2001), 204–5.
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in possession of the force and ability required to overcome the unlawful challenger.35
The author is here tapping into central strands of democratic ideology as it can be
reconstructed from Athenian law-court oratory and drama. Commitment to the rule of
law was generally presented and perceived, at least in Athens, as a distinctively
democratic ideal.36 In Euripides’ Suppliant Women Theseus contrasts the lawlessness
of one-man rule, on the one hand, and lawful popular government like that of
Athens, on the other (Eur. Supp. 429–37; cf. 403–8); and Aeschines expects his
audience to share his view that ‘tyrannies and oligarchies are administered according
to the temper of their rulers, but democracies according to the established laws’
(1.4).37 Moreover, in a famous passage from his speech against Meidias,
Demosthenes forcefully invokes the Athenians themselves as the ultimate defenders
and upholders of the laws. Having explained to the popular jurors that their authority
stems not from physical strength but from the strength of the laws (Dem. 21.223), he
turns around and asks (Dem. 21.224):
But what is the strength of the laws? For if one of you is wronged and cries out, will the laws
come running up and offer aid? No; they are just inscribed letters, and they have no power to act
independently. So what provides their power? You—but only if you support them and keep
them masterful in support of he who is in need. Thus the laws are authoritative through you,
and you through the laws. (Cf. 21.140–2.)
Now, it might perhaps seem that the conspicuous emphasis of the ‘Anonymus
Iamblichi’ on such democratic ideals in fr. 6 stands in some tension with his preferred
terminology. The anonymous author uses the term eunomia to describe the distinctive
respect for the laws, which makes the people naturally hostile to the pleonexic ‘man
of steel’ (διὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν εὐνομίαν, 101.2). This choice of political terminology,
which is also conspicuous throughout fr. 7, has been taken by some scholars to suggest
aristocratic leanings on the part of the author.38 After all, we frequently find eunomia
associated by Greek authors with distinctively aristocratic cities, in particular
Lycurgan Sparta, but also Epizephyrian Locris, Crete and Corinth;39 and the oligarchic
and Sparta-friendly author of the Xenophontic Constitution of the Athenians explicitly
contrasts the democratic regime of fifth-century B.C.E. Athens with a city that enjoys
eunomia (Xen. [Ath. pol.] 1.8.). But while these texts are clearly relevant for mapping
the connotations of eunomia in Greek political discourse, the assumption that the
appearance of the term in and of itself indicates a preference for aristocratic government
is too crude and should be abandoned in favour of a more nuanced approach. Our
sources indicate that the ideal of eunomia was a flexible political slogan that could
also be appealed to in explicitly democratic contexts, where the use of an acknowledged
aristocratic watchword would not have gone down well with the audience. When
Demosthenes praises the eunomia of the Locrians in his speech against Timocrates,
35 The same idea reoccurs, in an even more explicitly political context, at the end of fr. 7 in the
author’s discussion of the emergence of tyranny (103.20–104.14). The lawless rule of a tyrant only
becomes possible at the moment ‘when these two things, law and justice, leave the people’ (ὅταν
οὖν ταῦτα τὰ δύο ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους ἐκλίπῃ, ὅ τε νόμος καὶ ἡ δίκη, 104.2–3; cf. 104.5–6).
36 Cf. J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989), 299; M.H. Hansen, The
Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford and Cambridge, MA, 1991), 74.
37 Cf. also Dem. 24.75–6.
38 Musti and Mari (n. 2), 257–9.
39 For references, see G. Grossmann, Politische Schlagwörter aus der Zeit des Peloponnesischen
Krieges (New York, 19732), 33–8; Musti and Mari (n. 2), 257 (with n. 81).
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he does so in order to encourage his audience of Athenian citizen-judges to display a
similar respect for the laws (Dem. 24.139–40); and Aeschines pursues the same agenda,
in the passage already referred to above, when he declares that ‘you are strong when you
display eunomia and are not overthrown by those who break the laws’ (εὐνομῆσθε καὶ
μὴ καταλύησθε ὑπὸ τῶν παρανομούντων, 1.5).40 This compatibility of the eunomia
slogan with democratic discourse and culture can also be observed in the Athenian
art of the Classical period. The personification of eunomia seems to have been a popular
motive in Athenian vase-painting, which suggests that the term was not in itself per-
ceived to carry specifically aristocratic or anti-democratic connotations.41
However, while it is therefore not very helpful to approach the eunomia slogan as
indicative of a specific constitutional preference, this does not mean that the term
was wholly devoid of political connotations. A useful comparison can be made with
the slogan of ‘law and order’ in modern political discourse. In itself, the use of this
slogan does not normally reveal anything about the speaker’s constitutional preferences.
After all, the ideal of ‘law and order’ can be appealed to both by a right-wing military
junta attempting to justify deposing a democratically elected government and by a
parliamentary conservative party, wholly committed to democratic politics, in arguing
for a stricter law-enforcement policy. However, what we very rarely find is that the
‘law and order’ slogan is explicitly appealed to by parties of a distinctively left-wing
or progressive political outlook. While compatible with different constitutional
preferences, the ‘law and order’ slogan is clearly understood to be appealing to more
conservative values. This, I think, is how we should also approach the term eunomia
in the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’. Given the author’s direct appeal to distinctive democratic
ideals in fr. 6, we should not interpret his choice of terminology as suggestive of an
aristocratic outlook, let alone a preference for Lycurgan Sparta. But his choice of
terminology does show what specific sort of democratic values he takes to be most
important. What he is interested in are not the democratic values of, say, freedom or
equality.42 Rather, what he is concerned to do in the argument against the hypothetical
‘man of steel’ in fr. 6 is to highlight and applaud a specific democratic ideal that seems
much more congenial to a conservative outlook: the people’s respect for, and defence
of, the laws.
This sets the stage for the second step in the author’s immanent criticism of
democratic Athens, which follows immediately in fr. 7. As we have seen, the
lawlessness (anomia) that the author is concerned to denounce in that fragment is
first and foremost the lack of respect for the ownership rights of ‘the fortunate’, that
is, the wealthy. According to him, the lower classes’ disregard for these rights is
what fatally poisons the relations between rich and poor in the city, leading to pernicious
effects for both the socio-economic and the psychological environments. On my
interpretation offered above, the author’s concern with this particular form of
lawlessness reflects his distinctive social point of view as a rich quietist in democratic
40 Cf. also [Dem.] 25.11, 35. Even if E. Harris is right that this speech is a later Hellenistic forgery
(Demosthenes. Speeches 23–26 [Austin, 2018], 193–7), it was clearly meant to sound like something
that could plausibly have been delivered in fourth-century B.C.E. democratic Athens, which makes it
relevant as a source for understanding the political connotations of eunomia in that period.
41 Cf. A.C. Smith, Polis and Representation in Classical Athenian Art (Leiden, 2011), 72–6.
42 On the importance of these ideals in Athenian democratic ideology: Hansen (n. 36), 73–85. In
the final section of fr. 7, the author does mention the regrettable loss of freedom (ἐλευθερία) under
tyrannical rule (103.24). But there the discussion is specifically about the political freedom of the
community, not about the liberties of individual citizens.
ANDERS DAHL SØRENSEN106
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838821000288
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 94.6.184.54, on 15 Jul 2021 at 13:13:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
Athens. But it is also important to note that the author himself insists on a close
connection between this particular concern and the discussion in the preceding
fragment. Not only does he take up again the terminology of eunomia introduced in
fr. 6 and puts it at the centre of his vision of the ideal society. But he also, even
more strikingly, portrays the state of anomia as one that is characterized, specifically,
by pleonexia (ἐξ ἀνομίας τε καὶ πλεονεξίας, 103.28). The abstract problem raised in
the sixth fragment is thereby translated into much more concrete social terms. What
we are being told is that the unjust desire for ‘more than one’s fair share’ is not an
exclusive feature of some hypothetical ‘man of steel’. It is also characteristic of the
attitude of the lower classes (‘the less fortunate’) towards the property of their social
superiors in a society where the laws are not being respected.
On this basis, we can construe fr. 6 and fr. 7 as parts of a single argument aimed at
the author’s contemporary society. While the argument against the pleonexic ‘man of
steel’ in fr. 6 serves to bring to the fore the high standard for lawfulness that
Athenian democracy claims for itself, the seventh fragment goes on to point out how
it falls lamentably short of that standard in an important respect. A democratic society
like Athens, where the laws that supposedly protect private ownership are systematically
trampled underfoot in favour of unjust pleonexia on the part of the lower classes, is a
democratic society that fundamentally fails to live up to its own ideal of respect for
the laws. Not unlike Plato in Republic Book 8 the ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ gloomily
predicts that this failure will eventually lead to stasis, war and the rise of a tyrant
(102.18–21, 103.8–10, 103.20–104, 106; cf. Pl. Resp. 564b–66d). But the underlying
message is that it need not come to this. After all, as we have seen, fr. 7 also contains
a portrayal of what a society characterized by a genuine commitment to respect for the
laws would look like. The democracy of the Athenians can be saved from itself, but only
if it moderates itself and rediscovers its eunomia, in particular its respect for the basic
legal rights of its wealthy citizens to their private property as well as to their personal
peace of mind.
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